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CASENOTES
CRIMINAL LAW -

EVIDENCE -

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-

LEGE - DISCLOSURES BY CRIMINAL DEFENDANT TO
DEFENSE-RETAINED PSYCHIATRIST HELD WITHIN SCOPE
OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WHICH DEFENDANT
DOES NOT WAIVE BY PLEADING INSANITY. STATE v.
PRATT, 284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421 (1979).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The attorney-client privilege exists to assure freedom of
communication between the client and his legal advisor. In State v.
1 the Court
Pratt,
of Appeals of Maryland, in a long-overdue decision
in support of this fundamental policy, held that disclosures made by
a criminal defendant to a psychiatrist retained by defense counsel to
aid in the preparation of an insanity defense are protected by the
attorney-client privilege 2 The court further held that a defendant
does not waive the privilege merely by pleading insanity. 3 The court
limited its holding to criminal proceedings, however, and declined to
decide whether the privilege should extend to disclosures made to
4
experts retained in the course of civil litigation.
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF PRATT
Margaret Pratt shot and killed her husband on the morning of
October 23, 1976, after having spent a sleepless night contemplating
suicide. 5 Later she surrendered herself to the police and was indicted
for murder. Considering the feasibility of an insanity defense, Mrs.
Pratt's attorney retained a psychiatrist, Dr. Brian Crowley, to
examine her.6 Dr. Crowley determined that she was sane at the time
of the shooting, however, so his report was not used by the defense.
At trial, Mrs. Pratt admitted the killing, but contended that she
was insane when she fired the shots. In support of this defense, her
attorney put two psychiatrists on the stand. In rebuttal, the state
introduced the testimony of three other psychiatrists, 7 including Dr.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421 (1979).
Id. at 520, 398 A.2d at 423-24.
Id. at 522, 398 A.2d at 424-25.
Id. at 523 n.5, 398 A.2d at 425 n.5.
Mrs. Pratt followed this with a day of erratic behavior which included a drive
from Montgomery County, Md. to Front Royal, Va. to spend several hours in
prayer at the gravesite of her dog. She then spent the night in a motel and
returned to Maryland the next day, driving aimlessly around the old neighborhood in which she and her husband had lived. Upon realizing that she would be
apprehended, Mrs. Pratt confessed to Montgomery County police, who verified
her story and arrested her for murder. Id. at 518, 398 A.2d at 422.
6. See Md. Rule 731(a) and MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25 (1979). These provisions
authorize and describe the interposition of the insanity defense.
7. Pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 23, 25(b) (1979), the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County ordered that respondent be examined by the Department of
Mental Hygiene. 284 Md. at 518, 398 A.2d at 422.
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Crowley. Mrs. Pratt's attorney objected to Dr. Crowley's testimony
on the basis that disclosures made by her to Dr. Crowley during his8
examinations were protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the testimony. Ultimately,
Mrs. Pratt was convicted of second-degree murder. 9 The court of
special appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the attorneyclient privilege had been violated, 10 and the court of appeals
unanimously affirmed.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege, oldest of the common law privileges, 1 had its origin in Roman Law which recognized the almost
familial nature of the attorney-client relationship. 12 Judicial factfinding was subordinated to the policy of protecting this relationship; imperial mandate incapacitated an advocate from testifying
for or against his client.' 3 The English common law attorney-client
privilege against compelled disclosure first appeared during the
sixteenth-century reign of Elizabeth I. The privilege was based upon
the attorney's oath not to reveal confidences and upon his honor as a
gentleman of the law. 14 By 1776, however, obstructions to the courts'
search for5 truth had fallen into disfavor, and the privilege had
collapsed.'
The modern formulation of the privilege emerged in the mid1800's with the development of the theory that the efficient
resolution of disputes, and the avoidance of unnecessary litigation,
would be facilitated by a client's full disclosure of all facts to his
attorney. 6 The rationale was that if the client knew his lawyer could

8. Objection was also made at the time on the grounds of the work-product doctrine.
Pratt v. State, 39 Md. App. 442, 446, 387 A.2d 779, 782 (1978). The court of appeals
did not address this issue.
9. Respondent was also convicted of the use of a handgun in the commission of a
felony. 284 Md. at 518, 398 A.2d at 422-23.
10. Pratt v. State, 39 Md. App. 442, 387 A.2d 779 (1978).
11. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughten rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].

12. See Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Radin], cited in C.
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §87 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].

13. Radin, supra note 12, at 488.

14. Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 131, 345 A.2d 830, 836 (1975); WIGMORE, supra
note 11, at §2290, cited in MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at §87.
15. Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 131, 345 A.2d 830, 836 (1975). Harrisonconsiders
the Duchess of Kingston's Trial, [17761 20 Howell, State Trials 355,586, to be the
point of honor theory's last gasp. The Duchess exempted her attorney from
secrecy, and although he demurred, raising the point of honor, he was required to
testify. See WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2290, cited in MCCORMICK, supra note
12, at § 87.
16. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2296; MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 87; Radin,
supra note 12, at 491.
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not testify against him, he would feel free
to reveal even those facts
17
he considered unfavorable to his case.
The privilege is now recognized as belonging solely to the
client.' 8 Commentators agree that an attorney can best represent his
client when he knows all the facts, and that confidentiality,
controlled by the client, encourages complete candor. 19 Beyond this,
however, the authorities disagree. 2° Older treatises maintain that the
privilege, although essential, is an exception to the general rule of
disclosure of all relevant evidence and should be strictly construed
because it tends to suppress pertinent facts. 21 Preeminent among
these is the multi-volume commentary of Dean Wigmore, who often
sounds like Poe's Charley Goodfellow 22 - the more he attempts to
justify the privilege, the more he undermines it. Wigmore maintains
that although the risk of unjust decisions is outweighed by the need
for freedom from apprehension of involuntary disclosures of
attorney-client confidences, the privilege ought not be extended any
further than necessary in contravention of the more basic testimo23
nial duty to reveal the truth.
More recent authors view attorney-client confidentiality as the
rule and not the exception. 24 They argue that the privilege rests on
17. Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 134, 345 A.2d 830, 837 (1975) (citing State v.
Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 415, 129 A.2d 417, 425 (1957) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §2291 (3d ed. 1940)); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 207 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LOUISELL & MUELLER]; Radin, supra
note 12, at 491.
18. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 92; WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2321.
19. E.g., Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 25-26 (1942), quoted in
City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 235, 231 P.2d
26, 30 (1951). Morgan states:
Unless [the client] makes known to the lawyer all the facts, the advice
which follows will be useless, if not misleading; the lawsuit will be
conducted along improper lines, the trial will be full of surprises, much
useless litigation may result.
20. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17, at § 207.
21. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2291, construed in City & County of San Francisco
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 235, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (1951); In re Richardson, 31
N.J. 391, 396-97, 157 A.2d 695, 698 (1960). But see Lindsay v. Lipson, 367 Mich. 1,
5, 116 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1962).

22. E. POE, Thou Art the Man, in

COMPLETE STORIES AND POEMS OF EDGAR ALLAN

POE (1966). In this tale, Charley Goodfellow murders an old friend under
circumstances which make it look as if the deed had been done by the victim's
ne'er-do-well nephew. Goodfellow publicly "defends" the nephew at every turn,
but suceeds only in implanting every incriminating detail firmly in his listeners'
minds.
23. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2291; see United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921
(2d Cir. 1961). See also the oft-cited but rather specious line of reasoning
opposing the attorney-client privilege in Morgan, Suggested Remedy for
Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 285,
289-91 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Morgan].
24. E.g., Sedler & Simeone, The Realities of Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHIO
ST.L. J. 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Sedler & Simeonel. The authors noted that
legal advice, not litigation, is the main function of the attorney, and that the
primary method of protecting the client is through advice based on the client's
confidential disclosures. "An exception to the rule of secrecy should not be made
to further the trial of a lawsuit." Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
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such solid constitutional bases as the sixth amendment right to
counsel, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
due process fairness, and, lately and quite persuasively, the right to
privacy.m One commentary contends that attorney-client confidentiality is not only essential to adequate representation, but also
because it always precedes litigation, on a prior tempore priorjure
rationale, it should outweigh the interest in full disclosure of
probative evidence. 26 Another maintains that rather than obstructing the search for 27
truth, the privilege actually furthers it by
discouraging perjury.
Wigmore's universally-cited treatment of the subject sets out the
dimensions of the privilege. It arises when an actual or prospective
client seeks legal services or advice from an attorney in his
professional capacity. All communications made in confidence for
the purpose of obtaining the lawyer's advice are permanently
protected from disclosure by the attorney if the client does not waive
the privilege. 28 . Additionally, courts have held that agents in the
attorney's office such as clerks, stenographers, and interpreters are
included within the privilege because their presence is necessary
to
29
facilitate communication between the attorney and the client.
In order to represent and advise his client adequately the
attorney often needs information regarding areas in which he has

25. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17, at § 207; accord,United States v. Alvarez,
519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3rd Cir. 1975). See the interesting treatment of Alvarez in
Note, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 409 (1976).
26. Sedler & Simeone, supra note 24, at 2-3.
27. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17, at § 207. Contra,Morgan, supranote 23, at
289; see J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 473-75, 477, 479 (Bowring ed. 1842), quoted in WIGMORE, supra note
11, at § 2291.
28. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2292. It is a rare article on attorney-client privilege
that does not cite or quote outright Dean Wigmore's famous principle:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
Id. For a narrower, and no doubt impertinent, revision of this formula, see
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
29. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at §§ 2301, 2317; MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 91; C.
TORCIA,

3

WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

§ 559 (13th ed. 1973); Annot., 96

A.L.R.2d 125 (1964). The last authority states: "[T]he attorney-client privilege
does not automatically extend to any group of third persons . . . . [A] third
person's function, rather than his status, determines his competency to testify
under the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 128. See, e.g., State v. Krich, 123 N.J.L.
519, 9 A.2d 803 (1939) (stenographer); State v. Sterrett, 68 Iowa 76, 25 N.W. 936
(1885) (clerk); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (interpreter)
(dictum); cf. Morton v. Smith, 44 S.W. 683, 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898).
In Morton, a clerk-stenographer was compelled to testify because he was not
a "media of communication" between attorney and client. Otherwise, the court
reasoned, "it could as well be claimed that the rule would extend to the employee
who swept the attorney's floor."
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little training. This may necessitate his consulting or sending his
client to an expert in that field.A° To the extent that the client is less
candid with the expert than he is with the attorney, the attorney will
be deprived of the use of this specialized information. Courts and
legislatures have uniformly held that communications to, or in the
presence of, a third-party expert who is reasonably necessary for the
attorney to advise his client knowledgeably are also covered by the
attorney-client privilege. 31 Cases have specifically extended the
privilege to accountants, appraisers, scientific experts and physicians.

3 2

In the criminal arena, the question becomes whether a
defendant may reveal facts to a psychiatrist retained by his attorney
so that the lawyer may prepare an insanity defense without fear of
disclosure. Courts that have addressed the issue acknowledge that a
successful insanity defense is virtually impossible without expert
advice and testimony, 33 and that a defendant must be "as free to
communicate with a psychiatric expert as with the attorney he is
assisting."34 Therefore, they extend the privilege to psychiatrists
retained by counsel on the grounds that they are agents of the client

30. E.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961); United States ex rel.
Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp 1038, 1047-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
31. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17, at § 209; 3 B. JONES, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 831 (5th ed. Gard rev. 1958); Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 116 (1964). But see
Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
STAN. L. REV. 455, 463-69 (1962).

32. E.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (accountant);
State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land in New Castle County, 193 A.2d 799, 810 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1963) (appraiser); Lindsay v. Lipson, 367 Mich. 1, 5-6, 116 N.W.2d 61,
62-63 (1962) (physician); Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87
F. 563, 564 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898) (scientific expert).
33. E.g., Ex parte Ochse, 38 Cal. 2d 230, 231, 238 P.2d 561, 561 (1951); United States
v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3rd Cir. 1975); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d
371, 377 n.9 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE
124-25 (1967)): "In practical terms, a successful defense without expert testimony
will be made only in cases so extreme or so compelling in sympathy for the
defendant, that the prosecutor is unlikely to bring them at all."
34. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3rd Cir. 1975); accord, Note, 51
N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 411 (1976); cf. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d
Cir. 1961) (necessity for communication with accountant concerning problems in
that field).
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or attorney, 35 interpreters of a specialized37 "language, '"36 or messengers or conduits of expert information.
In an analogous area, disclosures made to a doctor qua doctor in
a treatment-oriented relationship were not entitled to confidentiality
at common law. 38 Notwithstanding this tradition, and over harsh

criticism from the legal and academic communities, 39 most states
have created some statutory form of doctor-patient or psychiatristpatient privilege. 40 The theory behind these privileges, similar to the
attorney-client rationale, is that the patient will be encouraged to
seek treatment if he knows his disclosures to the doctor will be
confidential. 41 While the statutory attorney-client privileges usually
35. E.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 237, 231
P.2d 26, 31 (1951): "A communication, [to the attorney] then, by any form of
agency employed or set in motion by the client is within the privilege."

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

(emphasis in original); State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 412, 129 A.2d 417, 423
(1957): "[T]he 'doctor was the agent of the attorney and the sub-agent of the
defendant, or vice versa,' and 'in any event, he was an agent.' "; WIGMORE, supra
note 11, at § 2301; and Annot., 53 A.L.R. 369 (1928). But see Note, 16 VAND. L.
REV. 419, 420-22 (1963) (criticizing both the use of the agency theory and the
extension of the attorney-client privilege to physicians employed by the
attorney).
E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975); Ex parte Ochse,
38 Cal. 2d 230, 232, 238 P.2d 561, 562; City & County of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 237, 231 P.2d 26, 31 (1951); see Note, 16 VAND. L. REV. 419,
420-21 (1963); 3 B. JONES, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 21:15 (6th ed. Gard rev. 1972); cf.
United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) ("Accounting concepts are
a foreign language to some lawyers in almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers
in some cases.").
E.g., People v. Goldbach, 27 Cal. App. 3d 563, 568, 103 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803 (1972);
People v. Hilliker, 29 Mich. App. 543, 546, 185 N.W.2d 831, 833 (1972); Lindsay v.
Lipson, 367 Mich. 1, 7, 116 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1962); see People ex rel. Edney v.
Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). See generally Note, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 409, 438 (1976).
See MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 98 (doctor-patient); 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409,
441 (1976) (psychiatrist-patient); Rappeport, Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege, 23
MD. L. REV. 39 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Rappeport]; LOUISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 17, at §215.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
("Legal scholars have been virtually unanimous in their condemnation of these
legislative efforts to foster the doctor-patient relationship by rules of exclusion.");
Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing
The Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); WIGMORE,
supra note 11, at §2380(a); Baldwin, Confidentiality between Physician and
Patient,22 MD. L. REV. 181, 186-89 (1962); Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an
Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455, 463-69 (1962).
LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17, at §216 (quoting Ferster, Statutory
Summary of Physician-PatientPrivilegedCommunication Laws, in READINGS IN
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 239 (Allen, Ferster & Rubin rev. ed. 1975)):
[Florty states recognize a psychiatrist-patient privilege, six by specific
psychiatrist-patient statute and the remainder by physician-patient
statute, that twenty-two of these states also recognize by statute a
psychologist-patiei.t privilege, and that an additional five states confer a
privilege upon patients of psychologists but not psychiatrists.
Compare Morgan, supra note 23, at 291 ("Nor is there any objective evidence that
the . . . absence [of the privilege] has had an adverse influence . . . . Have the
physically afflicted shunned the famous physicians and surgeons of Baltimore
because Maryland denies any such privilege? No one has had the temerity to
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codify the common law,42 doctor-patient privileges have no such
historical basis and depend on the legislatures for their creation and
termination. 4 3 An important distinction between the two is the socalled patient-litigant exception to the doctor-patient and
psychiatrist-patient privileges. 44 When a patient's physical or mental
condition is put into issue at trial, confidentiality is waived and the
doctor may be compelled to testify. 45 Except for New York, no such
exception to the
attorney-client privilege exists anywhere in the
46
United States.
IV. WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Although the attorney-client privilege is permanent, outliving
the professional relationship and even the client, 47 it is not absolute,
and it may be waived either expressly or by implication. 48 The courts

look to Wigmore's two factors of intent and fairness to determine
whether a waiver has been effected. 4 9 If the client merely takes the
stand in his own behalf there is generally held to be no waiver.50 If,
make such an assertion.") with Franklin v. State, 8 Md. App. 134, 141, 258 A.2d

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

767, 771 (1969) (Defendant stumbled into a hospital and told the doctor he had
taken a large dose of heroin. He was later convicted for possession when the
doctor was allowed to testify. The court candidly admitted: "That this decision
will likely deter drug addicts and users from seeking medical help when they
need it is, unfortunately, the all too plain result of this case.").
Note, 16 VAND. L. REV. 419, 420 n.2 (1963) ("Thirty-seven jurisdictions.., have
statutes purporting to define the scope of the privilege, but these are generally
held to be merely declarative of the common law." (citing WIGMORE, supra note
11, at § 2292 n.2)).
Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 334, 307 A.2d 503, 529 (1973) ("[The privilege]
exists by legislative grant, and ordinarily the legislature may provide the
conditions under which it is applicable."). See Rappeport, supra note 38; Annot.,
44 A.L.R.3d 24 (1972).
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 996, 1016 (West 1966), construed in People v. Lines,
13 Cal. 3d 500, 511, 531 P.2d 793, 800, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 (1975). See generally
Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 946 (1954).
E.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-109(d)(3)(i) (Supp. 1976)
(psychiatrist-patient privilege). The statute provides for the exclusion of the
privilege "in a civil or criminal proceeding . . .[where] [t]he patient introduces
his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense."
People v. Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620, 350 N.E.2d 400, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1976). See text
accompanying notes 60-66 infra.
See WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2321-23; Note, 16 MINN. L. REV. 818, 822 (1932); 2
H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 333 (6th ed. P. Herrick 1973) [hereinafter
cited as UNDERHILL].
UNDERHILL, supra note 47, at §333; see WIGMORE, supra note 11, at §2327
("[T]he waiver, like the privilege, belongs solely to the client.").
WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2327. Dean Wigmore might be dismayed, however,
to find that the "fairness" he intended as a justification for finding an implied
waiver of the privilege is now being used to sustain the privilege against such a
finding. See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 138, 345 A.2d 830, 840 (1975).
State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 416-17, 129 A.2d 417, 425-26 (1957) (" '[O]therwise,
the privilege of consultation would be exercised only at the penalty of closing the
client's own mouth on the stand'. . . . [It] would subvert the privilege of the
confidential relation.") (citation omitted); see UNDERHILL, supra note 46, at § 333;
Sedler & Simeone, supra note 24, at 26.
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however, he testifies concerning matters protected by the privilege
on direct examination,5 1 or permits his attorney to do so, or fails to
object to the attorney or his expert doing s0,52 the courts may find an
implied waiver. On the other hand, it has been suggested that while
the doctrine of implied waiver is acceptable in civil litigation,
fundamental fairness mandates the recognition of only express
waivers in criminal trials. 5 3 As noted above, however, the other
"lesser" privileges of confidentiality that developed regarding
disclosures to medical experts (the physician-patient and
psychiatrist- or psychotherapist-patient privileges) are subject to the
patient-litigant exception removing protection once the patient
places his mental condition in issue by raising the defense of
54
insanity.
The question of whether a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
should also be implied by assertion of the insanity defense, in effect
a client-litigant exception, has been answered by the courts with a
nearly unanimous and rather unequivocal, "No." Certainly, if the
psychiatrist is called to testify for the defense, the privilege is
waived, but unless and until the expert is called, the privilege
55
remains intact.
51. Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 136-37, 345 A.2d 830, 839 (this testimony would
also enable the attorney to testify - a complete waiver is effected); WIGMORE,
supra note 11, at §2327. See generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 521, 529-37 (1957).
Maryland also takes the majority position that if the client testifies as to the
privileged information on cross-examination, there is no waiver. See also People
v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 100 (1954) (merely answering
questions on cross-examination did not show intent to waive privilege). But see
WIGMORE, supra note 11, at § 2327; MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 93 ("Unless
there are some circumstances which show that the client was surprised or
misled," a waiver will be found.).
52. Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 78
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (waiver may be found where client lets his attorney testify
without objection); Note, 16 MINN. L. REV. 818, 826 (1932).
53. UNDERHILL, supra note 47, at § 333 (It is "doubtful if any waiver should be
implied in a criminal trial."); accord, People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277
P.2d 94, 100-01 (1954) (Shinn, P.J., concurring). In his concurrence, Judge Shinn
insisted: "The privilege of confidential communication between client and
attorney should be regarded as sacred. It is not to be whittled away by means of
specious argument that it has been waived. Least of all should the courts seize
upon slight and equivocal circumstances as a technical reason for destroying the
privilege." Id.
54. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17, at § 215 ("When the patient puts his
physical [or mental] condition in issue," the privilege is waived.); e.g., Lind v.
Canada Dry Corp., 283 F. Supp. 861, 864 (D. Minn. 1968) (The Minnesota rule
provides for a waiver when a plaintiff brings a personal injury suit.); Hill v.
Huddleston, 263 F. Supp. 108, 110 (D. Md. 1967). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.
3d 912 (1968).
55. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1047 (3d Cir. 1975); People v. Lines,
13 Cal. 3d 500, 514, 531 P.2d 793, 802-03, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225, 234-35 (1975); State
v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 416, 129 A.2d 417, 425-26 (1957); cf. Pouncey v. State, 353
So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (exception if the defense so depletes the
supply of experts as to prejudice the state unfairly). Contra, People v. Edney, 39
N.Y.2d 620, 624-25, 350 N.E.2d 400, 402-03, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25-26 (1976); cf.
Singleton v. State, 90 Nev. 216, 217, 522 P.2d 1221, 1222 (1974). The defendant's
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In United States v. Alvarez, 56 the leading case, the Third Circuit
warns against the chilling effect such a waiver would have on
consideration of the insanity defense. 57 The defendant would
hesitate to cooperate with the psychiatrist for fear that his
disclosures would incriminate him. The attorney would be reluctant
to consult a number of experts, wary of creating a potential weapon
for the prosecution, or helping the state to meet its burden of proving
the defendant's sanity.5 8 The Alvarez court therefore rejected the
idea of a waiver arising merely from an insanity plea, concluding
that its effect would be to make the defendant choose between
making a potentially incriminating disclosure to his defense team
and foregoing an insanity defense, a choice that would deprive the
accused of the effective assistance of counsel. 9
The sole discordant note was sounded by New York in People v.
Edney.60 There the New York Court of Appeals decided that the
rationale supporting an implied waiver of the physician-patient
61
privilege was likewise applicable to attorney-client confidentiality.
The Edney court noted that a defendant seeking to raise an insanity
defense could be compelled to submit to an examination by state
psychiatrists. 62 On the assumption that the defendant would
cooperate with the state's doctors as candidly as with his own, the
majority reasoned that the state would have before it the very facts
the privilege would shield.6 3 If the defense never raises the insanity

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

former attorney testified in Singleton on rebuttal that the defendant was not
always truthful, but that he was always a "lucid individual." The court held the
defendant had waived the privilege by placing his sanity and credibility into
issue and calling other former attorneys.
519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1047; see Note, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 440 (1976).
United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046-47 (3d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1046.
39 N.Y.2d 620, 350 N.E.2d 400, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1976).
Id. at 625, 350 N.E.2d at 403, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 26. See People v. Al-Kanani, 33
N.Y.2d 260, 264, 307 N.E.2d 43, 44, 351 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (1973) ("[Wlhere
insanity is asserted as a defense and, as here, the defendant offers evidence
tending to show his insanity in support of this plea, a complete waiver [of the
physician-patient privilege] is effected ....

").

62. People v. Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620, 625, 350 N.E.2d 400, 403, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23, 26
(1976).
63. Id. If one accepts that premise, however, then "[t]he State already has access to
the underlying factual basis of the accused's mental affliction for use by its [own]
psychiatrists," and would not significantly benefit from access to the defenseemployed psychiatrist. Pratt v. State, 39 Md. App. 442, 451, 387 A.2d 779, 785
(1978). Even if one disagrees with the Edney majority's reasoning, its approach
is still unrealistic because it ignores the so-called "battle of the experts" problem.
Even if the defendant were fully cooperative with the state psychiatrist, the need
for the privilege would not be obviated. Because techniques vary among different
schools of psychiatry, examinations of the same subject often yield different
results. Furthermore, even if a number of psychiatrists are supplied with the
same information, it is quite conceivable that their conclusions as to the subject's
mental state will be contradictory. See Professor Slovenko's interesting
treatment of the problem in Slovenko, Reflections on the Criticisms of
Psychiatric Expert Testimony, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 37, 38 n.4 (1978). See also A.
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issue, however, no waiver occurs. 64 Moreover, the court pointed out,
the attorney still has his work-product privilege which will protect
any disclosures he makes to the psychiatrist while contemplating
the defense. 65 Judge Fuchsberg, in dissent, refused to accept the
majority's logic and urged against finding a waiver. He warned
against confusing disclosures made within the treatment-oriented
physician-patient privilege with "communications to physicians
within the compass of and as an adjunct to the attorney-client
privilege.

'66

V. THE PRATT COURT'S ANALYSIS
The questions faced by the court in Pratt were ones of first
impression in Maryland. 67 The first issue, whether the defendant's
disclosures to a psychiatrist retained to enable her counsel to prepare
an insanity defense were protected by the attorney-client privilege,
was conceded by the state. Judge Digges was therefore able to move
briskly to the conclusion that because of the "complexities of modern
existence, ' 68 lawyers must be able to consult non-legal experts in
order to advise their clients effectively. Proceeding on the theory that
the expert functions as an agent of the attorney, the Prattcourt held

GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY
CRIMINAL LAW §40 (1972).

DEFENSE

134 (1967); W.

LAFAVE

& A. ScoTr,

64. People v. Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620, 625, 350 N.E.2d 400, 403, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23, 26
(1976). The Edney holding, of course, effectively impales the defendant on the
horns of what the Alvarez court and other jurisdictions have found to be an
impermissible dilemma. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
65. People v. Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620, 625, 350 N.E.2d 400, 403, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23, 26
(1976). The majority's position on this issue, although erroneous, might explain
the anomalous Edney holding. "The attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine are wholly separate both in coverage and in underlying
rationale." LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17, at § 211 (an excellent
comparison of the two doctrines).
66. People v. Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620, 627, 350 N.E.2d 400, 404-05, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23,
27-28 (1976) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Judge Fuchsberg
also noted that in all the other jurisdictions which had reached the opposite
conclusion from Edney, there had not been a single dissent. Id.
There is, however, a limited amount of support for the Edney majority's
opinion in some academic corners. Professor Friedenthal of Stanford, for
instance, maintains that the psychiatrist is not a pure conduit or interpreter of
information disclosed by the client. Rather, as an expert, the psychiatrist adds
an "increment" of his own medical knowledge, which should be as discoverable
as the knowledge of any other witness. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an
Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455, 463 (1962). See also
note 39 supra (citing anti-privilege articles).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of California probably understated
the problem with this approach when it noted it could "conceive of situations...
where it may be an impossible task for the psychiatrist to report or testify as to
unprivileged information without drawing upon and utilizing that which is
privileged." People v. Lines, 13 Cal. 3d 500, 515-16, 531 P.2d 793, 804, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 236 (1975).
67. 284 Md. 516, 517, 398 A.2d 421, 422 (1979).
68. Id. at 520, 398 A.2d at 423.
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that in a criminal case, a defendant's disclosures to an expert are
protected by the attorney-client privilege when the purpose of the
disclosure is to enable the expert to furnish the attorney with the
69
specialized information necessary to represent the client properly.
The court particularly addressed the special need of the criminal
defense attorney to secure expert medical advice when the accused's
sanity is in issue, recognizing not only the necessity of medical
testimony in the actual presentation of the insanity defense, 70 but
also the need for the attorney to become familiar with essential
psychiatric concepts. It specifically reserved, however, the question
of whether the privilege
extends to experts retained in furtherance of
71
civil litigation.

The second issue, whether the insanity defense results in an
implied waiver of the privilege, presented a more difficult problem.
Because Maryland has a statute similar to the New York law, which
authorizes a court-ordered examination of a criminal defendant
raising the insanity defense, 72 the Pratt court was obliged to
consider the reasoning of the Edney court. 73 The prosecution in Pratt

asked the court to create an exception to the attorney-client privilege
that would waive confidentiality, similar to the patient-litigant
74
exception to Maryland's psychiatrist-patient privilege.
69. Id. at 520, 398 A.2d at 423-24.
70. Indeed, Maryland statutory provisions indicate the need for the criminal
attorney contemplating an insanity defense to secure expert assistance before
proceeding very far. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(b) (1979) (when accused
enters an insanity plea, court may order mental examination). See also MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-120 (Supp. 1979) (psychologists certified under the
"Psychologists' Certification Act" and qualified as expert witnesses may testify
as to ultimate issue of sanity, as well as psychiatrists).
In addition, a recent court of special appeals decision, Conn v. State, 41 Md.
App. 238, 396 A.2d 323 (1979), held that lay witnesses may not testify on the
ultimate issue of a criminal defendant's sanity. The court of appeals, however,
reversed this holding, ruling that lay persons may so testify when they have
Md. __,
had adequate opportunity to observe the accused. State v. Conn, __
408 A.2d 700 (1979). The court of appeals reasoned that normal and abnormal
408 A.2d at 700.
conduct are matters of common knowledge. Id. at __,
Note, however, that under the court of appeals decision in Conn, only a
psychiatrist or a psychologist may conduct an after-the-fact inquiry into the
sanity of an accused. Id. at -, 408 A.2d at 710. Consequently, the necessity,
under ordinary circumstances, of obtaining expert testimony is critically
important for the criminal defense attorney.
71. 284 Md. at 523 n.5, 398 A.2d at 425 n.5.
72. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(b) (1979) and note 7 supra. New York actually no
longer has a statute authorizing a court-ordered examination, apparently
because it was accidentally eliminated from a re-drafted criminal procedure code.
One New York court, however, stepped in and declared:
The People clearly had the right to move for a psychiatric examination
under Section 658 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, and . . . that
right cannot be lost under Article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law
merely because there may have been an oversight in omitting this
provision.
People v. Traver, 70 Misc. 2d 162, 164, 332 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (1972).
73. See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra.
74. See MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §9-109(d)(3)(i) (Supp. 1979).
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The court agreed there was some degree of mechanical logic to
the Edney opinion, but rejected the waiver notion because of the
"chilling effect" it would have on the attorney-client relationship. 75
The court was reluctant to create a situation in which the defendant
could confide in his attorney or the attorney's expert only at the risk
of creating a prosecution witness. Citing Alvarez, it declared that the
defense attorney should be able to consult a number of experts
without fear of assisting the state in meeting its burden of proving
the defendant sane.7 6 Further, it reasoned that revealing to the jury
that the adverse testimony came from the defendant's own expert
77
would certainly result in considerable prejudice to the defendant.
Acknowledging that forcing such a dilemma on a criminal
defendant might have state and federal constitutional implications,
Judge Digges concluded that the court
could not transform an
78
insanity plea into an implied waiver.
VI. EVALUATION
79
At common law, Maryland had no physician-patient privilege
(and still has none), no psychiatrist-patient privilege,80 and the
attorney-client privilege was never construed to cover third-party
experts retained by the attorney to help him prepare for trial. As Dr.
Jonas Rappeport, eminent Maryland psychiatrist and Chief Medical
Officer of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, noted, "One cannot
help but wonder why there has not been real trouble to date."8 '
These comments were made just before the psychiatrist-patient
privilege was enacted in 196482 over bitter opposition from the
Maryland legal community.83 He offered the explanation that "we
have somehow managed to have an 'extra-legal' psychiatrist-patient
privilege by the courtesy of the court and the bar" (and an

75. 284 Md. at 522, 398 A.2d at 424.
76. 284 Md. at 524, 398 A.2d at 425-26. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
77. 284 Md. at 522-23, 398 A.2d at 425. With City of Baltimore v. Zell, 279 Md. 23, 28,
367 A.2d 14, 17 (1977), Maryland has adopted the minority position of vesting the
trial court with the discretion to admit evidence of an expert's "employment
posture," evidence considered irrelevant by the majority of jurisdictions. E.g.,
Dicker v. United States, 352 F.2d 455, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

78. 284 Md. at 524-25, 398 A.2d at 426. Maryland thus mirrors the approach of every
other jurisdiction that has faced the question, except New York, in holding that
there is no exception to the attorney-client privilege comparable to the patient-

litigant exception. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1047 (3d Cir.
1975); People v. Lines, 13 Cal. 3d 500, 511, 531 P.2d 793, 802, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225,
232 (1975); City & County of SanFrancisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227,

237-38, 231 P.2d 26, 31 (1951).
79. E.g., Franklin v. State, 8 Md. App. 134, 141, 258 A.2d 767, 771 (1969). See O'Brien

v. State, 186 Md. 270, 284, 94 A. 1034, 1040 (1915).
80. See Rappeport, supra note 38, at 39.
81. Id. at 47.
82. See MD. CTS.& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-109 (1974). The privilege was enacted,
of course, subject to the patient-litigant exception.
83. Rappeport, supra note 38, at 39.
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occasional memory lapse by the doctors). 84 - Such an unreliable
"privilege" was inadequate protection against compelled disclosure.
In 1973, Maryland finally enacted an attorney-client privilege
statute that states: "A person may not be compelled to testify in
violation of the attorney-client privilege."85 The statute officially
sanctions the common law privilege, but makes no attempt to define
or to explain it.86 In the absence of any assurance that disclosures to
non-legal experts would be covered by the privilege, a client had a
difficult choice to make: forego adequate legal representation by not
revealing anything to his attorney's expert, or make full disclosure
and risk creating a superb witness for the other side. In the case of a
criminal defendant whose counsel was considering an insanity
defense, the dilemma was critical. The attorney in this situation
could: (1) refrain from raising the defense for fear of causing his
client to make incriminating disclosures to an expert who could later
be summoned to testify for the prosecution; (2) tell the client that
none of his disclosures to the doctor are protected, knowing full well
that the client will withhold anything he considers incriminating; or
(3) send the client to the doctor without telling him about the absence
of privilege. In each instance, the defendant is deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel.
As a result of Pratt,a criminal defendant can communicate with
necessary experts as freely as with his attorney. With this decision,
Maryland joins the overwhelming majority of states that include
necessary experts within the protective umbrella of the attorneyclient privilege and refuse to find a waiver merely because the
defendant puts into issue the matter for which the expert was
retained.
Despite these virtues, however, Pratt leaves several questions
unanswered. The court reserved decision upon whether the attorneyclient privilege extends to experts retained in civil cases, and of
course, it did not consider the question of experts retained by counsel
who do not contemplate litigation. Likewise, the Pratt opinion left
definition of the scope of an implied waiver of the privilege to future
cases. Finally, the Prattcourt did not find it necessary to address the
problem that would occur were a defense attorney to consult most or
all of a limited number of experts in a field, and thus prevent the
prosecution from obtaining its own witnesses.
Inasmuch as the court has aligned itself with jurisdictions that
have extended the privilege to both civil and criminal expert
84. Id. at 47.

§ 9-108 (1974).
86. Of course, Canon 4 of the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility was already
codified to admonish lawyers to preserve their clients' confidences, but as the
Fourth Circuit so aptly pointed out, "Observance of the canon is commendable.
The canon, however, does not purport to state the law governing the attorneyclient privilege." NLRB v. Harvey, 399 F.2d 900, 906 (1965).
85. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
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consultants, 7 it is likely that Maryland courts will eventually bring
civil experts within the scope of the privilege. The courts will
probably continue to look to the common law principles of intent and
fairness to determine when the privilege is waived. 8 Experts not
retained in contemplation of litigation should fall within the scope of
the privilege so long as the object in consulting them is to provide
the client with competent legal representation. 89 As for the rare case
where the defense consults all the available experts in a field, the
court will probably modify the privilege, applying the rationale of
the Florida District Court of Appeals: "The one major exception to
this attorney-client privilege is where the trier of fact is so deprived
of valuable witnesses as to undermine the public interest in the
administration of justice."' 9
VII.

CONCLUSION

Until State v. Pratt, a criminal defense attorney risked seriously
damaging his client's insanity defense merely by retaining the
expert psychiatric assistance needed to prepare it. Prattassures that
the retention of a psychiatrist by the defense does not create a
potential witness for the prosecution. Although the decision leaves
questions unresolved, it is nonetheless welcome as a case that fills a
rather sizeable gap in the Maryland criminal defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel. Finally, the Pratt decision paves the
way for expansion of the coverage of the attorney-client privilege to
non-legal experts consulted by the lawyer in order to advise his
client more effectively.
Stuart J. Cordish

87. E.g., People v. Hilliker, 29 Mich. App. 543, 185 N.W.2d 831 (1971). There, the court
held: "[T]he reasoning of the court [in a civil proceeding] is equally applicable to
a criminal case." Id. at 548, 185 N.W.2d at 833, referring to Lindsay v. Lipson,

367 Mich. 1, 116 N.W.2d 60 (1962) (civil case). On the other hand, the sixth
-amendment considerations are not present in civil cases.
88. This is admittedly still a rather vague standard, but Harrison v. State, 276 Md.
122, 345 A.2d 830 (1975), provides as good a starting point as any.
89. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (accountant expert).
The Kovel court observed that if "what is sought is not legal advice, but only
accounting service, or if the advice sought is the accountant's rather than the
attorney's no privilege exists."
90. Pouncey v. State, 353 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).

